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THE SOUNDS OF THE SUPREMES:  
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR YASSKY 
DAVID B. KOPEL* 
I would like to thank David Yassky for his well-written response to my 
article.1 Over the last few years, I have had the pleasure of debating Professor 
Yassky on several radio programs; his writing, like his discussions on the 
radio, is thought-provoking, concise, and gentlemanly. 
In my article in this symposium, I suggested that readers who think that the 
1939 Miller case2 was the beginning and end of the Supreme Court’s Second 
Amendment jurisprudence should broaden their view by studying everything 
that the Supreme Court has said about the Second Amendment.3 David Yassky, 
in reply, gives both me and the Supreme Court too much credit for creativity, 
and for inventing novel approaches to the Second Amendment. Let’s start by 
discussing the credit that I do not deserve. 
I. WHAT’S A REVISIONIST AND WHAT DO THEY THINK? 
Professor Yassky includes me in “a group of revisionist scholars” who are 
promoting a “new paradigm” trying to overthrow the “dominant view” of the 
Second Amendment.4 Were the Yassky/Kopel dialogue taking place in The 
Journal of Post-modern Deconstruction, Professor Yassky’s words would be 
high compliments, limited only by his failure to credit me with “transgressing 
boundaries” But since we are discussing law, which (unlike the writing of  
Jacques Derrida) is supposed to be intelligible, I must decline the honor of 
being a “revisionist.” Along with other Standard Model scholars of the Second 
Amendment, I am merely continuing in a well-worn path of Second 
Amendment analysis. 
 
         * Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado, http://i2i.org; J.D. 1985 
University of Michigan Law School; B.A. in History, 1982, Brown University.  Author of Gun 
Control and Gun Rights (NYU Press, forthcoming, 2001). 
 1. David Yassky, The Sound Of Silence: The Supreme Court And the Second 
Amendment – A Response to Professor Kopel,  18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (1999) [hereinafter, 
“Yassky”]. 
 2. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 3. David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-four Other  Second Amendment Cases, 18 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99 (1999) [herinafter, “Kopel”]. 
 4. Yassky, text at n. 2-4. 
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A. Who are the Revisionists? 
The core of the Standard Model is that the Second Amendment guarantees 
a right of all Americans (not just militia members) to own and carry firearms. 
As to the contours of this right, the Standard Model is well-settled on some 
points, and unsettled on others, as I will detail in the next section. 
The reason that “the Standard Model” is the standard model is that it has 
been in use for as long as legal scholars have been writing about the Second 
Amendment. Starting with St. George Tucker’s American edition of 
Blackstone in 1803, every legal scholar who wrote about the Second 
Amendment during the nineteenth century wrote within the Standard Model. 
(Indeed, there was no other model.) These scholars include St. George Tucker, 
William Rawle, Joseph Story, Henry St. George Tucker, Francis Lieber, 
Thomas Cooley, Joel Tiffany, Timothy Farrar, Joel Bishop, John Norton 
Pomeroy, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., George Ticknor Curtis, John C. 
Ordononaux, Henry Campbell Black, James Schouler, and John Randolph 
Tucker. Nobody who wrote any surviving legal scholarship (whether in a 
treatise or a law journal article) even disputed that the Second Amendment 
guarantees a right of all American citizens—rather than a state’s right, or a 
right only of militia members.5 
Legal scholars in the twentieth century, of course, were divided. From 
1930 to 1970, there were fewer than two dozen law journal articles written 
about the Second Amendment, and those articles were sharply split on the 
meaning of the Second Amendment.6 
During the last three decades of the twentieth century, there was much 
more legal scholarship published on the Second Amendment, and the large 
majority (but not all) of these articles were within the Standard Model 
tradition. By the end of the twentieth century, scholars as diverse as Laurence 
Tribe,7 William Van Alstyne,8 Akhil Amar,9 Leonard Levy,10 and Sanford 
Levinson11 had published articles or treatises affirming the Standard Model. 
One would be hard-pressed to find many other important constitutional issues 
on which all five of these eminent scholars agree. Accordingly, it is the 
scholars such as Professor Yassky—who imply that everyone in the above two 
 
 5. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1359 (quoting every word that listed authors and other nineteenth century legal scholars 
wrote regarding the Second Amendment). 
 6. See David B. Kopel, Comprehensive Bibliography of the Second Amendment in Law 
Reviews, 11 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL. 1 (1999). 
 7. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 902 (3d ed. 2000). 
 8. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 1236 (1994). 
 9. AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998). 
 10. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 134 (1999) 
 11. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). 
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paragraphs (from St. George Tucker in 1803 to Laurence Tribe in 2000) is 
wrong—who deserve the title “revisionist.” 
B. Who Thinks the Supreme Court is Wrong? 
According to Professor Yassky, the Standard Model scholars “heretofore 
conceded that the courts have rejected their approach.”12 Standard Modelers, 
writes Professor Yassky, charge that “the courts (abetted by the academy) have 
all-but-nullified the Amendment.”13 Thus, Professor Yassky gives me credit 
for opening up “a second front” in the Second Amendment argument.14 I am 
hardly so deserving of credit. To say that I “seek[] to open a second front” is 
like saying that a G.I. who joined Patton’s Third Army in March 1945 was 
seeking “to open a second front” against the Germans. In fact, the so-called 
“second front” on the Second Amendment has been open for about 125 years. 
Contrary to Professor Yassky’s (unfootnoted) assertion, the Standard 
Model scholars have always argued that the Supreme Court supports their 
model. The Supreme Court’s first major Second Amendment case was the 
1876 United States v. Cruikshank.15 After 1876, legal treatises on the Second 
Amendment continued to use the Standard Model, and began citing 
Cruikshank and (after 1886) Presser 16 as cases which showed the boundaries 
of the individual Second Amendment right (that the right was a limit on federal 
action only). Almost all of the nineteenth century authors who discussed the 
Supreme Court and the Second Amendment used the Surpeme Court cases to 
support the authors’ position, and none of the Standard Model scholars 
suggested that the Supreme Court decisions were contrary to an individual 
right.17 Among modern Standard Model scholarship, argument that the 
Supreme Court cases buttress the Standard Model are likewise ubiquitous.18 
Indeed, the only Standard Model article which claims that the Supreme Court 
disagrees with the Standard Model is a 1960 article in the West Virginia Law 
Review.19 
I will take credit for being the author of the first law journal article to look 
at every Supreme Court case mentioning the Second Amendment; but to credit 
 
 12. Yassky, text at n. 8. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 16. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 17. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, supra note 5. 
 18. E.g., STEPHEN HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: 1866-1876 (1998); Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Origin of 
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983); Levinson, supra; L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, 
Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311 (1997). 
 19. Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 W. VA. 
L. REV. 381 (1960). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
206 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:203 
me with inventing an entirely new argument is to grossly overstate my 
significance. 
Standard Model scholars are also in agreement that since 1971, there have 
been a plethora of cases in the lower federal courts that are inconsistent with 
the Standard Model. And these lower courts are accused (sometimes in full-
length articles, sometimes in long parts of other articles) of nullifying both the 
original intent of the Second Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.20 
My immediate point is not about whether the Standard Model scholars are 
correct to think that the Supreme Court has always agreed with them. My point 
is that the Standard Model scholars have always thought that the Court did. 
 
 20. E.g., Brannon Denning, Can the Simple Cite be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations 
of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961 (1995-96)(arguing 
that lower federal courts have misapplied Miller); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the 
Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65 (1983)(criticizing some 
lower court decisions, while arguing that Supreme Court cases support an individual right); 
Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and 
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 157 (1999)(criticizing lower 
federal courts). 
  Professor Yassky observes that, if the Standard Model is accurate, then the lower federal 
court cases “are a shocking departure from the framer’s intentions.” Yassky, supra n. 1, text at n. 
45.  Yassky asks “Why.” Id. The answer is the same reason that the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was judicially nullified in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, why the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment was likewise nullified in the same 
period, and why Article I limits on Congress’s enumerated powers were nullified from the late 
New Deal until recently: judges believed that the constitutional provision in question was 
contrary to good policy, and so the judges invented specious rationales to evade the text and 
intent of the Constitution. 
  Professor Yassky explicitly rejects the “living Constitution” (a euphemism for a dead 
constitution) theory that judges can excise parts of the Constitution they do not like. Yassky, at n. 
45.  He writes that “amendments to one part of the Constitution can have ramifications for other 
parts.” Id.  I think he is right. For example, as Akhil Amar writes, the Congress which wrote the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not much concerned with protecting state militias (which had just 
been defeated in the Civil War) from being disarmed; instead the Congress was intensely 
concerned with protecting Freedmen (who were under frequent assault by Ku Kluxers and other 
terrorists) from being disarmed by racist state governments.  Hence, the Congressional 
discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act, and the Reconstruction Act 
contained explicit statements about the need for statutes and constitutional amendment to protect 
“the right to keep and bear arms” from state infringement.  Thus, write Amar, “between 1775 and 
1866 the poster boy of arms morphed from the Concord minuteman to the Carolina freedman.” 
AMAR, supra n. 9, at 266. The Fourteenth Amendment helped transform the Second Amendment 
into the form in which it is most familiar to most Americans today—involving a right to personal 
protection in the home (rather than a guarantee that militias could resist federal tyranny). 
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C. What Would a Meaningful Second Amendment Mean? 
Professor Yassky writes that “the revisionists never quite specify just what 
a ‘personal’ Second Amendment would protect.”21 This assertion is just as 
flatly wrong as Professor Yassky’s claim that Standard Model scholars are 
revisionists who think that the Supreme Court is against them. To find what the 
Second Amendment protects (under the Standard Model) one need only read 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds’ Tennessee Law Review article “A Critical Guide to 
the Second Amendment.”  Since this is the article which coined the phrase 
“Standard Model,” the article may be taken as a reasonable explication of the 
contours of the Standard Model.22 
The Standard Model scholars agree that the Second Amendment 
guarantees23 a right of ordinary citizens to own and carry firearms. Almost all 
of the Standard Model scholars would include handguns, shotguns, and rifles 
within the scope of the protection, although Don Kates argues for rifle bans in 
urban areas.24 With a few exceptions, most of the scholars have no Second 
Amendment objection to measures such as the federal instant background 
check for prospective gun buyers. The “Compelling State Interest” and  “Least 
Restrictive Alternative” tests, which are well developed in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, provide an easy template for preserving gun controls which 
make a genuine contribution to public safety without infringing the rights of 
the blameless. 
There are still unsettled issues regarding the boundaries of the Second 
Amendment (are machine guns included?) and how much various degrees of 
licensing/registration/waiting periods might infringe the Second Amendment. 
But the existence of these unresolved issues at the edge of the Right to Arms 
does not mean that Standard Model scholars have failed to detail what is in the 
core. That First Amendment scholars in the 1930s or 1940s had not settled 
some issues (e.g., the boundary line for obscenity; exactly what requirements 
were appropriate for parade permits; how to treat non-verbal communication 
such as arm bands) does not mean that those scholars failed to “specify” what 
the First Amendment protects (most types of political and artistic speech, 
except for incitement, according to those First Amendment scholars). 
 
 21. Yassky, supra n. 1, at n. 25. 
 22. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 
461 (1995)(Second Amendment right is violated by gun bans, but not by regulations such as 
background checks, as long as the regulations are reasonably applied). 
 23. Not, as Yassky writes, “confers.” Yassky, supra n. 1, at 191.  The Standard Model, like 
the Cruikshank case, sees the Second Amendment as protecting a pre-existing human right, rather 
than creating a new right. United States v. Cruikshank, supra n. 15 (right to arms and right to 
assemble are guaranteed but not created by the Constitution; they are found “found wherever 
civilization exists”), discussed in Kopel, supra n. 3 text at notes 325-27. 
 24. Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra n. 18 . 
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Nor is Professor Yassky correct to claim that the Standard Model, if 
judicially implemented, would make it impossible to disarm people who are 
subject to restraining orders for domestic violence.25 In the Emerson case, the 
federal district judge (whom Professor Yassky accurately calls a follower of 
the Standard Model) explicitly stated that it is not a Second Amendment 
violation to disarm a domestic violence perpetrator. 26  The problem with the 
statute in question, the judge explained, was that the statute did not require any 
finding that domestic violence had occurred, or might occur.27 In an amicus 
brief filed to the Fifth Circuit, in support of the trial court’s ruling, Academics 
for the Second Amendment (a Standard Model educational group) and the 
more than 100 professors who signed the brief explained that if a court made 
findings of danger based on sworn, credible evidence, then disarming the man 
(or woman) who created the danger would not violate the Second 
Amendment.28 This 1999 amicus brief was squarely in line with Sam Adams’ 
proposal, at the 1788 Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, that a Bill of Rights 
be added to the Constitution, specifying, that, inter alia, “the said Constitution 
be never construed to authorize Congress to infringe the just liberty of the 
press, or the rights of conscience; or to prevent the people of the United States, 
who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms. . .”29 
 
 25. Yassky, supra n. 1, at n. 42. 
 26. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (Tex. 1999). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Amicus Brief for Academics for the Second Amendment, United States v. Emerson, no. 
99-10331 (5th Cir.)(the brief was filed in December 1999; the case has not been decided, as of the 
date that this article was written).The brief does not address the issue of whether Congress has 
power under the Interstate Commerce clause to ban the simple, non-commercial possession of a 
firearm by an individual. In a revisionist article, which claims that many prior Supreme Court and 
lower court cases were incorrectly decided, Glenn Reynolds and I suggest that the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, according to the logical implications of the Lopez case, and according to 
Constitutional plain language, should not be interpreted to allow Congress to prohibit purely 
intrastate non-commercial activities—such as possessing a firearm, cultivating marijuana for 
personal medical use, or having an abortion with one technique rather than another. David B. 
Kopel & Glenn Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59 (1997). 
 29. Samuel Adams, Motion at the Massachusetts Convention, Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in THE 
ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
1787-1792, at 260 (David E. Young, ed., 1995)(emphasis added). In modern usage, the comma 
after “United States” would make the reference to “peaceable citizens” a non-restrictive clause, so 
that “peaceable citizens” would be read as a compliment about “the people” rather than as a 
restriction on who may keep arms. But as a quick glance at the Third Amendment shows, writers 
in the Early Republic used commas in ways which are not always consistent with twenty-first 
century style. Adams, by the way, voted against his own call for a Bill of Rights, as part of the 
complex maneuvering around the issue of ratifying the Consitution. ORIGIN, at 263 n. 4. 
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D. Who’s the Real Revisionist? 
For decades, the scholarly Second Amendment debate has been between 
those who believe that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right 
of all peaceable American citizens to possess firearms (the Standard Model) 
and those who believe that the Second Amendment grants a right to state 
governments, not to individuals (the “state’s rights” theory, most prominently 
advocated by Dennis Henigan and Carl Bogus).30 This state’s rights theory has 
been popular in many, but not all, lower federal courts, since the early 1970s. 
The first paragraph of Professor Yassky’s article accurately quotes a 1971 case 
in which the Sixth Circuit sneered at an individual’s complaint about the 
federal Gun Control Act of 1968; for, wrote the Sixth Circuit, the Second 
Amendment “applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not 
to the individual’s right to bear arms. . .”31 
Now, David Yassky suggests that this decades-long debate has posed a 
false dichotomy: the Second Amendment is intended to benefit states by letting 
them have militias; under Professor Yassky’s  “instrumental” reading of the 
Second Amendment, individuals have Second Amendment rights if and only if 
those rights are exercised to benefit state militias.32 
Professor Yassky’s amicus brief in the Emerson case sets forth this theory 
in more detail.33 He acknowledges that, as a result of the Second Amendment, 
individuals have a right to “keep” firearms in their homes.34 But what about the 
federal law which would send Dr. Emerson to jail, simply for possessing a 
firearm in his house? The Yassky brief argues that since Dr. Emerson was not 
a member of the Texas National Guard (even though Emerson is, by Texas 
statute, a member of the Texas militia) there is no Second Amendment 
problem with sending him (or, by implication, anyone else who is not a 
Guardsman) to federal prison for owning a gun.35 And even if Dr. Emerson 
were in the National Guard, the Yassky brief continued, he could still be 
disarmed (since the Texas Guard could assign him to a non-gun job), and (by 
implication) many other Guardsmen could be disarmed, as long as the Texas 
Guard was still able to function.36 
Thus, Professor Yassky’s highly constricted, “instrumental” interpretation 
of the Second Amendment bears some resemblance to the Ninth Circuit’s view 
of the Tenth Amendment: nothing the Congress does to the states can violate 
 
 30. E.g., Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993); Dennis A. 
Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107 (1991). 
 31. Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971), quoted in Yassky, supra n. 1, 
text at n. 3. 
 32. Yassky, supra n. 1, text at n. 42. 
 33. Yassky Brief for Ad Hoc Coalition, United States v. Emerson, no. 99-10331 (5th Cir.). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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the Tenth Amendment, unless Congress prevents state governments from 
functioning.37 
From the creation of the Second Amendment until 1915, no scholar 
suggested that the Second Amendment meant what Professor Yassky says; in 
those days, the Standard Model was the only scholarly model. Then, a 1915 
article in the Harvard Law Review took the first step in Professor Yassky’s 
direction. Lucillius Emery suggested that the Second Amendment should be 
interpreted to allow the disarmament of everyone who was not eligible for 
militia service, including women and minors.38 Emery was the first American 
legal scholar to suggest that the Second Amendment did not protect all 
Americans (militia-eligible or not) who were entitled to civil rights. Although 
the 1903 Dick Act, creating the modern National Guard, had enrolled only a 
small part of the adult male population in the National Guard, Emery 
acknowledged that the Second Amendment protected the entire militia-eligible 
population (most adult males), rather than just members of the National 
Guard.39 
Emery’s article, while provocative, never got much intellectual traction. 
For the next 80 years, articles in law reviews argued for either the Standard 
Model, or for a rule which would prohibit disarming the National Guard 
because the Second Amendment was  a state’s right, not an individual right. 
Then, in 1995, a closer precursor of Professor Yassky’s theory was 
published. Andrew Herz (a law professor at Touro, who has since departed the 
academy) argued in the Boston University Law Review for what he called a 
“narrow individual right” to join the National Guard.40 In Herz’s view, the 
Second Amendment did not guarantee an individual’s right to possess a gun, 
but the Amendment did guarantee his right to join the National Guard, wherein 
the government would give him a gun.41 
Herz’s article was undermined by its vicious personal attacks on scholars 
who disagreed with him, and by a self-righteous, illogical tone so intense that 
he managed to condemn the National Rifle Association for encouraging blacks 
to be armed against white rioters and for not caring about the safety of 
 
 37. Printz v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  This 
argument was, obviously, repudiated by the Supreme Court’s majority decision reversing the 
Ninth Circuit.  The Supreme Court dissenters, while disagreeing with the majority result, never 
argued in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s extreme standard. 
 38. Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 
473 (1915). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of 
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995). 
 41. Id. 
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blacks.42 Moreover, Herz’s theory, if seriously applied, would appear to deny 
the National Guard the ability to enroll Guardsmen selectively, rather than 
accepting all comers. 
Professor Yassky’s Emerson brief, even though it is a brief and not a law 
review article, is a major step forward from Lucillius Emery and Andrew Herz. 
He makes much more sophisticated use of original sources than do Emery and 
Herz; his writing style is somewhat better than Emery’s, and vastly better than 
Herz’s immature invective. When (I hope) Professor Yassky turns the brief 
into a law journal article, he will have produced a major new theory of the 
Second Amendment, and it will be a theory that demands a conscientious 
response from Standard Model writers. And being an article which attempts to 
explain why both major schools of thought on a constitutional subject are 
wrong, Professor Yassky’s future article will merit being called “revisionist.” 
It will be  the kind of “fresh thinking” that tenure review committees and law 
journal editors like so much. My article in this symposium issue deserves no 
such honors; were a newspaper to summarize my article, the headline would 
read: “Supreme Court Opinions Generally Agree with Law Professor 
Opinions, Writer Says.” Not much ground-breaking “revisionism” there. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES 
Almost all of Professor Yassky’s comments about my analysis of 
particular Supreme Court cases involve Fourteenth Amendment cases. 
In the 1886 Presser decision, the Supreme Court declined to make the 
Second Amendment directly enforceable against the states, and implied that 
the right to arms was not part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities.43 The Presser decision was, arguably, a follow-up of some dicta 
from the 1876 Cruikshank case.44 Professor Yassky writes that the Supreme 
Court’s failure to incorporate the Second Amendment is “something of an 
embarrassment” to Standard Model advocates.45 Annoying to some, perhaps, 
but not embarrassing. 
The Supreme Court’s failure to incorporate the Second Amendment is 
entirely consistent with a strong individual right to arms (protected against 
federal action only), just as the Supreme Court’s failure to incorporate the 
grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment is fully consistent with a strong 
individual right to grand jury indictment in federal court. Likewise, most of the 
criminal procedure Amendments of the Bill of Rights were not incorporated 
before the 1960s, but legal scholars before the 1960s did not claim that non-
 
 42. Id.  For an analysis of Herz’s mean-spirited article, see Randy E. Barnett & Don B. 
Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996). 
 43. See Kopel supra n. 3, at 173. 
 44. Discussed in id., at 172. 
 45. Yassky, supra n. 1, text at n. 34. 
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incorporation was some proof that these Amendments did not guarantee 
“personal” rights. 
To be sure, most of the Standard Model authors argue that the Supreme 
Court should revisit Presser.46 But Nelson Lund, an important Standard Model 
author, writes that Presser was rightly decided, and should be preserved.47 The 
Supreme Court’s non-incorporation of the Second Amendment, so far, poses a 
serious problem for gun owners in the six states which have no right to arms in 
their state constitution, but non-incorporation does nothing to undercut the 
Standard Model of a Second Amendment protecting a strong individual right 
against federal infringement. 
Professor Yassky takes issue with my treatment of Justice Harlan’s dissent 
in Poe v. Ullman. I had argued that Harlan’s use of the right to keep and bear 
arms in a list of individual rights, which could be incorporated against the 
states, showed that Harlan recognized the Second Amendment as an individual 
right.48 
Professor Yassky points out that the Harlan quote tells us nothing about the 
“specific contours” of the Second Amendment.49 Of course not. But it does tell 
us something about the core. 
Let us keep Justice Harlan’s grammatical and logical structure, but change 
the subject matter: 
The full scope of material to be consumed cannot be found in or limited by the 
precise terms of the specific items elsewhere provided in Smith’s list. This 
“material” is not a series of isolated things pricked out in terms such as apples, 
beefsteak, batatas, cherries, Madiera, prosciutto, Popsicles, parsley, sage, 
rosemary, thyme, sauerkraut, sushi, and so on.50 
Most readers of the above paragraph have never used the word “batatas” in a 
sentence, and the paragraph hardly gives the reader enough information to 
discern the “specific contours” of “batatas.” But does the paragraph supply 
enough information to suggest the essence of “batatas”? Well, yes. Even 
though the list uses English words (beefsteak, Popsicle) and foreign words 
(prosciutto, sauerkraut, sushi), the reader can see that all of the other items on 
the list are things that can be eaten. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that 
“batatas” are edible. And they are; “batatas” is Portuguese for “potatoes.” 
 
 46. E.g., Levinson, supra n. 11. 
 47. Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1 
(1996). 
 48. Kopel, supra n. 3, at 127. 
 49. Yassky, supra n. 1, text at n. 32. 
 50. This is the same as Harlan’s structure: The material in a thing (Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty) is not confined to the items in a list (the Bill of Rights) such as (enumeration of items on 
the list). 
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Likewise, on Justice Harlan’s list, if everything else in the list is an 
individual right, then it is reasonable to conclude that “the right to keep and 
bear arms” is an individual right. 
Professor Yassky is wrong to claim that Harlan’s quote can be consistent 
with Yassky’s “instrumental” (Guardsmen-only) theory. A Yassky Second 
Amendment would prevent the federal government from entirely disarming the 
State Guards, but a Yassky Second Amendment could do nothing to limit state 
disarmament of citizens; since the Yassky Second Amendment is meant to 
benefit official active state militias only, states can presumably do whatever 
they want with their militias, including disarm them.51 Harlan’s quote 
describes “the right to keep and bear arms” as a right which could (but in 
Harlan’s view should not) be made enforceable against state governments. 
Harlan’s Second Amendment is consistent only with the Standard Model. 
(Hardly a surprising result, given that Harlan’s grandson, University of 
Tennessee law professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds, coined the term “Standard 
Model.”52) 
In the Yassky article, most of the Supreme Court cases cited in my article 
do not receive the kind detailed response which Professor Yassky provided on 
Poe v. Ullman and its progeny. He points out, quite correctly, that the Supreme 
Court cases for which I discuss standing (and the Court’s allowing individuals 
to raise a Second Amendment claim) are consistent with both the Standard 
Model and with his Guardsmen-only theory; he likewise acknowledges that 
these cases are inconsistent with the state’s-rights-only theory.53 
Professor Yassky then brings the reader to the Miller case, and uses the 
case to argue for his “instrumental” and innovative reading of the Second 
Amendment.54 I am not sure that the Miller opinion can shoulder this burden.55 
I cannot improve on the Miller summary by Professor Andrew McClurg: 
 
 51. As Yassky writes a few paragraphs later, if “the purpose of the Amendment is to enable 
states maintain militia,” then “states are certainly free to decline to take advantage of this 
opportunity.” Yassky, supra n. 1, text at n. 34. 
 52. Reynolds, supra n. 22 (noting that “Standard Model” is a term of art in physics 
scholarship). 
 53. Yassky, text at notes 12-22. 
  I think Yassky understates how pervasive the state’s-rights-only (as opposed to Yassky’s 
narrow individual right) right theory has been in lower federal court decisions, and in the briefs 
filed by anti-gun groups and by U.S. Attorneys. But the quanta of state’s-rights-only 
argumentation is not really crucial to my article, or to Yassky’s reply; whatever the quantity of 
state’s-rights arguments, it is sufficient (for this article) simply to observe that Yassky is right to 
point out that an important number of the Supreme Court cases which are inconsistent with a 
states’ only theory are compatible with Yassky’s own theory. 
 54. The National Firearms Act of 1934, which was at issue in Miller, was not, as Yassky 
writes, “the first federal gun control law.”  In 1927, as a result of the violence resulting from 
alcohol prohibition, Congress banned the mail order sale of handguns. 
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But when all is said and done, the only certainty about Miller is that it failed to 
give either side a clear-cut victory.  Most modern scholars recognize this fact.  
For example Professor Eugene Volokh describes Miller as “deliciously and 
usefully ambiguous” in an article about using the Second Amendment as a 
teaching tool in constitutional law.56 
Volokh follows the Standard Model, and signed the Academics for the Second 
Amendment brief in Emerson; McClurg disputes the Standard Model, and 
signed the Yassky brief in Emerson. As their agreement about Miller 
illustrates, the case is a good starting point for all kinds of theories, but it is 
hardly a conclusive, clear endorsement of any theory. 
Any theory that starts with Miller needs to be tested in the broader world 
of the rest of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. My article in this symposium 
suggested that the Supreme Court’s other writings are about the Second 
Amendment are much more consistent with a Second Amendment right that 
can be exercised by all peaceable citizens than with any other theory of the 
Second Amendment. 
Finally, Professor Yassky suggests that the scarcity of Supreme Court 
cases directly addressing the Second Amendment deprives us of a vocabulary 
for meaningful thought about the Second Amendment. Yassky illustrates his 
“meaningful dialogue” point by showing how we discuss Equal Protection 
terms of Brown v. Board of Education, rather than Plessey v. Ferguson, or 
 
 55. For example, Yassky points out, accurately, that “military usefulness is the linchpin of 
Miller’s reasoning.” Yassky, supra n. 1, text at n. 42.  Thus, pursuant to Miller, Standard Model 
scholars acknowledge that a gun which had no militia utility but which was useful for recreational 
purposes (perhaps a hunting rifle that was extremely accurate, but so fragile as to be worthless 
under the rough handling typical of militiamen) would not be protected by the Second 
Amendment. But Yassky goes much further, and argues that Miller denies constitutional 
protection unless the purpose of the arms-bearing is for militia service.  Id.  Miller does not 
compel such a restrictive reading. For example, under Miller, the Beretta 92 pistol would be 
plainly protected, since it is the official sidearm of the U.S. Army (and thus, obviously, useful in a 
militia). But Miller does not necessarily deny protection to an individual who owns a Beretta 92 
for hunting, target shooting, or personal defense. The boot-legging defendants in Miller, after all, 
were not possessing their sawed-off shotgun in order to serve in the militia.  Yet the Miller Court 
focused on the type of gun, and the purposes of the possessors. The theory that the right to arms 
protects only guns with militia utility, and these guns may be possessed for any purpose by 
peaceable citizens, is precisely the theory adopted by the main line of nineteenth century state 
cases, several of which were cited with approval in Miller. See Kopel, The Second Amendment in 
the Nineteenth Century, at 1416-33 (discussing state cases); Kopel, supra n. 3 _____ (discussing 
Miller’s use of the nineteenth century cases). 
 56. Andrew J. McClurg, Lotts’ More Guns and Other Fallacies Infecting the Gun Control 
Debate, 11 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL. 139, 149-150 (1999), citing Eugene Volokh, Robert J. 
Cottrol, Sanford Levinson, L.A. Powe, Jr., Glenn H. Reynolds, The Second Amendment As 
Teaching Tool in Constitutional Law Classes, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 604 (1998)(each of the 
named authors in the Journal of Legal Education article wrote a separate essay, and the essays 
were combined under a single title; the quoted portion is from Volokh’s essay). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] THE SOUNDS OF THE SUPREMES 215 
discuss the First Amendment in terms of Brandenburg v. Ohio rather than 
Debs and Schenck.57 His point is that Second Amendment legal dialogue is 
unusual because it so often refers to first principles and original intent. 
This point is overstated. Even in areas where the Supreme Court has 
extensive caselaw (e.g., First Amendment Establishment Clause cases), 
recurrence to fundamental principles and original intent is very common in 
Court decisions and in legal arguments. 
Yet in regards to the majority of inferior federal courts from 1970 to the 
present, Professor Yassky is indisputably correct that the Supreme Court’s 
failure to establish a large body of case law has prevented the development of 
meaningful dialogue.58 As Brannon Denning has explained, the opinions 
consist of little more than lower courts quoting each other while making 
assertions about Miller that the case (no matter how imaginatively read) cannot 
support.59 
Fortunately, other writers have not been rendered incapable of meaningful 
thought. The lively dialogue in the law reviews shows that legal scholars do 
not need Supreme Court leadership in order to think constructively about a 
topic. Zechariah Chaffee, Theodore Schroeder, and other scholars in the first 
decades of the twentieth century wrote meaningful thoughts about the First 
Amendment (thoughts which are today part of the First Amendment’s Standard 
Model) even though the Supreme Court provided no useful leadership on the 
subject. 
Today’s scholars of the Second Amendment Standard Model are better off 
than were Chaffee and company; the Supreme Court’s words about the Second 
Amendment have been generally supportive of (and almost never inconsistent 
with) the Standard Model, whereas Chaffee, Schroeder, and other First 
Amendment scholars had to contend with a series of cases in the first decades 
of the twentieth century that were directly opposed to a meaningful First 
Amendment. 
The critiques of the Standard Model developed by David Yassky, Carl 
Bogus,60 and David Williams61 are thought-provoking; even though they are, I 
think, quite incorrect,62 they force Standard Model scholars to refine and 
improve the model. Should the Supreme Court ever clarify Miller, and 
 
 57. Yassky, supra n. 1, text at notes 46-54. 
 58. The same might be said of the Tenth Amendment, a subject on which Supreme Court 
case law has been sparse, until recently. 
 59. Denning, supra n. 20. 
 60. E.g., Carl Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
309 (1998). 
 61. E.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying 
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991). 
 62. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, supra n. 5, at 1512-29 
(critiquing Bogus and Williams). 
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repudiate the Standard Model dicta from dozens of other cases before and after 
Miller, and announce that the Second Amendment is no barrier at all to federal 
gun prohibition (except for guns belonging to National Guardsmen), it is likely 
that David Yassky’s sophisticated scholarship will play an important role in the 
decision. 
